Is a bank's decision to exit a market a risk appetite decision or a technology limitation? Banks that have merchant intelligence and product intelligence are able to assess merchant risk more accurately. Qredible's Merchant Intelligence Operating System gives banks and merchants both.

Your Bank's Risk Appetite Might Actually Be a Technology Limitation

Author: Noah Fitzgerald, CPP
Date: October 26, 2026

Your Bank's Risk Appetite Might Actually Be a Technology Limitation

How much legitimate commerce are financial institutions declining because they cannot distinguish unacceptable risk from insufficient information?


Noah Fitzgerald, CPP - Chief Revenue Officer, Qredible, Inc.There's a phrase I've heard thousands of times throughout my career in payments.

"That industry is outside our risk appetite."

Sometimes, that's exactly what it means.

A bank has evaluated the regulatory exposure, financial consequences, operational requirements and commercial opportunity. Leadership has determined that the business doesn't fit its strategy.

That's a legitimate decision.

But after more than three decades in payments, I've also seen something else.

Entire merchant categories declined because the institution lacks the resources, information or systems necessary to understand the risks within them.

Hemp. Vape. Nutraceuticals. Peptides. Telehealth. Certain types of lending and gaming.

The conversation often ends before anyone evaluates the individual business, much less the specific products being sold.

And I've started asking a question that I believe every acquiring bank and payment processor should consider.

Is that truly your risk appetite? Or is it the limit of what your technology allows you to understand?

Those are two very different things.

One is a deliberate business decision.

The other may be an operational limitation disguised as a risk policy.

And confusing the two could be costing financial institutions substantial revenue, merchant relationships and competitive opportunities.


Risk Appetite and Risk Visibility Are Not the Same Thing

Let's establish something important.

Banks have every right—and an obligation—to define the risks they are willing and able to accept.

Some activities are prohibited by law.

Some violate card-network rules or sponsor-bank policies.

Some present financial, reputational or operational exposures that an institution reasonably chooses not to support.

Technology does not eliminate those considerations.

And no amount of automation should be used to justify supporting prohibited commerce.

But here's where the discussion becomes interesting.

You cannot make a truly informed risk decision about something you cannot accurately identify.

Consider two retailers operating within the same broad industry.

Both may have similar websites.

Both may carry the same merchant category code.

Both may sell products that look nearly identical to the average consumer.

But one retailer may maintain current product documentation, sell products that meet applicable requirements and operate within clearly defined institutional policies.

The other may sell products containing restricted ingredients, make unsupported medical claims or offer products without required regulatory authorization.

Are these merchants presenting the same risk?

Of course not.

Yet many underwriting systems are better equipped to identify their industry classification than to distinguish the actual products they sell.

That gap matters.

Because when an institution cannot reliably differentiate the two, the easiest decision is often to decline both.

The problem isn't always excessive risk. Sometimes it's insufficient intelligence.


The Regulatory Environment Is Making This Impossible to Ignore

Recent developments in the vape industry provide a particularly clear example.

Pennsylvania: Compliance Is Increasingly Product-Specific

On October 19, 2026, Pennsylvania began enforcing restrictions under Act 57 of 2025 affecting electronic nicotine delivery systems.

The law established a state directory of products eligible for sale, with products absent from the directory subject to enforcement.

The Pennsylvania Attorney General's office maintains the directory and related certification information.

This creates a fundamentally different compliance question for a bank or processor supporting a vape retailer.

It's no longer sufficient to ask:

"Does this merchant sell vape products?"

The more relevant questions include:

  • Which specific products does the merchant sell?
  • Are those products included in the applicable state directory?
  • Does the merchant operate in additional jurisdictions with different requirements?
  • What happens when the directory changes?
  • How will the institution identify newly introduced products?

A merchant may sell multiple products with different regulatory statuses.

A category-level risk classification cannot answer those questions.

The regulation applies at the product level. The financial institution's intelligence must be capable of operating at that level, too.

Source: Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General — Electronic Nicotine Delivery System Directory

Iowa: Compliance Requirements Can Change Before They Even Take Effect

While Pennsylvania moved forward with enforcement, Iowa postponed implementation of its vapor products directory in October.

The state's planned publication and enforcement dates were delayed while officials continued reviewing product eligibility and manufacturer submissions.

Think about what this means operationally.

A financial institution supporting merchants across multiple states may need to manage:

  • Different product directories.
  • Different implementation dates.
  • Different eligibility standards.
  • Changes in enforcement timing.
  • Product-specific exceptions.
  • Different requirements across merchant locations and sales channels.

And those requirements are not static.

A product's regulatory status or the applicable enforcement requirements can change without any corresponding change to the merchant's ownership, MCC or transaction history.

Source: Bloomberg Law — Iowa Vapor Products Directory Publication and Enforcement Delayed, October 20, 2026


The FDA Is Also Reexamining Its Framework

On September 28, 2026, the FDA announced that it intends to evaluate changes to its Premarket Tobacco Product Application framework.

The agency cited its implementation experience, litigation developments, the illicit market and the pace of new product introductions.

Importantly, the FDA stated that it would continue processing applications and making regulatory decisions under existing statutory requirements while evaluating potential changes.

This is not an announcement that existing requirements have disappeared.

It's evidence that even regulators are reassessing how oversight frameworks should operate in rapidly evolving product markets.

Source: FDA — FDA Intends to Evaluate Changes to the PMTA Regulatory Framework, September 28, 2026

For banks and processors, the lesson is straightforward.

A compliance policy built around a fixed industry classification cannot, by itself, keep pace with a regulatory environment increasingly concerned with individual products.


The Cost of Saying No Is Rarely Measured

Banks spend enormous amounts of time evaluating the cost of accepting risk.

Regulatory exposure.

Losses.

Fraud.

Chargebacks.

Investigations.

Reputational consequences.

Compliance expenses.

Those costs deserve serious attention.

But what about the cost of declining business that could have been supported within the institution's actual risk parameters?

How often does that appear in an executive risk committee presentation?

Consider the commercial consequences of a blanket industry restriction.

A bank may lose the opportunity to acquire otherwise acceptable merchants.

Its existing merchants may move to competing providers.

ISOs and referral partners may redirect entire portfolios elsewhere.

The bank may lose processing revenue, deposits and related financial relationships.

And over time, it may become less competitive in industries where other institutions have developed more sophisticated underwriting and oversight capabilities.

None of that means a bank should accept an industry simply because revenue is available.

It means the cost of inaction should be evaluated alongside the cost of risk.

A disciplined institution should be able to ask:

"What would it cost us to support this industry responsibly?"

And just as importantly:

"What is the opportunity cost of continuing to exclude it?"

If the answer to the first question is based on manual reviews, disconnected databases, limited product visibility and insufficient monitoring capacity, there may be an opportunity to improve the
economics.

Not by changing the institution's standards.

By improving its ability to apply them.


The Problem With Treating Every Merchant in an Industry the Same

Imagine a retailer with 1,000 products.

Nine hundred and fifty meet the applicable requirements and the institution's policies.

Thirty require updated documentation.

Fifteen require additional regulatory evaluation.

Five are prohibited under the institution's policy.

These numbers are hypothetical, but the decision is familiar.

Does the bank terminate the entire relationship?

Does it decline the merchant at onboarding?

Does it attempt to review all 1,000 products manually?

Or does it identify the five prohibited products, evaluate the remaining exceptions, require corrective action and verify the outcome?

The appropriate answer depends on the law, the merchant's behavior, the institution's policies and the seriousness of the violations.

There will be circumstances where termination is necessary.

But there will also be circumstances where precise product-level remediation can address the exposure without ending an otherwise acceptable relationship.

That is the distinction between treating an entire business as a single undifferentiated risk and understanding the actual activities creating the exposure.

A product-specific problem should not automatically become a merchant-wide decision when the facts support a more targeted response.

But making that distinction requires something traditional underwriting systems often lack.

Product Intelligence.


Merchant Intelligence Without Product Intelligence Has a Blind Spot

Traditional Merchant Intelligence answers important questions.

Who owns the business?

Where does it operate?

What licenses does it hold?

What is its reputation?

What does its website represent?

How does it accept payments?

What is its financial and transaction history?

Those are essential components of responsible underwriting.

But in regulated commerce, another question increasingly determines the actual exposure.

What, specifically, is this merchant offering or selling?

Not just the category.

Not just the business description.

Not just what the merchant represented when it applied.

The actual products and services.

Their ingredients.

Their formulations.

Their labels.

Their marketing claims.

Their supporting evidence.

Their regulatory status.

Their geographic eligibility.

And the changes that occur after approval.

This is where Product Intelligence becomes essential.

It connects the merchant relationship to the underlying products that may determine whether the activity is acceptable.

And it allows financial institutions to move beyond a binary view of entire industries.


Better Technology Shouldn't Mean More Risk. It Should Mean More Precision.

I want to be clear about this distinction.

I'm not advocating for banks to become more aggressive in their risk appetite.

I'm advocating for them to become more informed.

Those are not the same thing.

A bank with a conservative risk appetite may be able to support additional merchants without changing its standards—provided it can reliably identify, evaluate and control the relevant exposures.

Conversely, better intelligence may reveal that an existing merchant presents unacceptable risks that were previously invisible.

That's equally valuable.

The purpose of better compliance technology isn't to approve more merchants at any cost.

It's to make better decisions.

Sometimes that means approval.

Sometimes that means conditional approval.

Sometimes that means remediation.

And sometimes that means decline or termination.

The objective is not a higher approval rate. It's a higher-quality decision.

Revenue growth should follow from improved risk precision, not from lowering standards.


The Missing Infrastructure: Continuous Product Intelligence

What would it take for financial institutions to make more precise decisions across regulated industries?

I believe five capabilities are fundamental.

1. Product Discovery and Identification

Understand which products and services a merchant actually offers across relevant websites, catalogs and sales channels.

Not just at onboarding.

Continuously, as material changes occur.

2. Regulatory and Policy Evaluation

Connect product attributes and available evidence to applicable federal, state, local, card-network and institutional requirements.

Identify where a product appears eligible, where additional information is required and where restrictions may apply.

3. Continuous Change Detection

Identify new products, modified formulations, changed marketing claims, expired documents and relevant regulatory developments.

A merchant's compliance profile should evolve as its activities evolve.

4. Structured Remediation

Convert findings into actionable exceptions.

Communicate requirements to merchants.

Collect supporting documentation.

Track corrective action.

Verify resolution.

Escalate unresolved issues according to institutional policy.

5. Defensible Evidence and Reporting

Maintain a record of what was evaluated, which requirements applied, what evidence supported the decision and how exceptions were resolved.

This is particularly important when an institution needs to explain its decisions to auditors, regulators, sponsor banks or card networks.

Monitoring tells you something changed. Intelligence helps determine what it means. Remediation turns that understanding into action.

And an auditable record helps demonstrate that the process actually occurred.


This Is Where Qredible Fits Into the Ecosystem

At Qredible, we've been building our Merchant Intelligence Operating System™ around this challenge.

Our approach connects merchant-level intelligence with product-level identification, regulatory evaluation, continuous monitoring, remediation and supporting evidence.

Q-Trust™ provides the product and compliance intelligence foundation.

MyCOA™ helps merchants manage product identity, testing evidence and relevant compliance documentation.

Q-Monitor™ supports ongoing change detection.

Q-Portal™ connects identified exceptions to merchant remediation workflows.

Q-Audit™ supports the evidence and decision history.

These capabilities are designed to complement banks' existing underwriting systems, monitoring platforms, certification providers and compliance processes.

The goal isn't to replace every system an institution already trusts.

It's to supply a missing layer of intelligence that helps those systems make more informed decisions.

We also recognize that technology has limitations.

Product classification requires reliable evidence.

Regulatory interpretation can involve uncertainty.

Some issues require legal review, human judgment or direct verification.

And institutions remain responsible for establishing and enforcing their own policies.

The value of Product Intelligence is not that it eliminates complexity. It's that it makes complexity more manageable, visible and actionable.


Five Questions Every Bank Executive Should Ask

If I were sitting in an acquiring bank's executive risk committee today, I would ask five questions.

1. Which industries have we excluded primarily because they are too difficult or expensive to underwrite and monitor?

That answer may reveal opportunities to improve infrastructure rather than change risk appetite.

2. Can we distinguish acceptable products from prohibited products within the same merchant category?

If not, how much of our decision-making depends on broad assumptions?

3. How do we know when an existing merchant introduces a product that changes its regulatory exposure?

Does the institution detect the change, or does it depend on the merchant to report it?

4. Can we remediate a product-specific issue without unnecessarily terminating the entire merchant relationship?

Where appropriate, precise remediation may preserve legitimate commerce while maintaining compliance standards.

5. Can we demonstrate what our systems detected, what action we took and how the issue was resolved?

Because monitoring without actionable resolution and supporting evidence is an incomplete control.

These are not questions intended to encourage indiscriminate expansion into higher-risk industries.

They are questions about whether an institution's risk decisions reflect its policies—or the limitations of the information available to apply them.


The Next Competitive Advantage in Acquiring May Be Risk Precision

For years, banks and processors have competed on pricing, distribution, technology integrations, customer service and operational efficiency.

Those capabilities still matter.

But as regulated commerce becomes more complex, I believe another competitive advantage is emerging.

The ability to understand and manage risks that other institutions can only broadly classify.

An institution that can evaluate products, apply policy consistently, monitor material changes and manage exceptions efficiently may have more options than one relying primarily on industry
exclusions.

That doesn't guarantee better financial performance.

The economics still need to work.

Regulatory requirements still apply.

And some industries may remain outside the institution's strategy regardless of technology.

But the opportunity deserves consideration.

Because a bank that understands risk more precisely may be able to preserve relationships, improve underwriting efficiency and support legitimate commerce that would otherwise be excluded.

Not by taking more risk.

But by knowing more about the risk it is already being asked to evaluate.


So, Is It Really Your Risk Appetite?

The next time a bank or processor says an industry is outside its risk appetite, I hope the conversation goes one step further.

Is the activity prohibited?

Does it conflict with established policy?

Is the potential exposure unacceptable?

Do the economics fail to justify the necessary controls?

Or does the institution simply lack the intelligence and infrastructure to evaluate and monitor the business at the level of detail required?

All are legitimate considerations.

But they are not interchangeable.

And they should not automatically lead to the same strategic conclusion.

Risk appetite should be a decision made with sufficient information—not a substitute for information the institution doesn't have.

The payments industry has spent decades building increasingly sophisticated systems to understand transactions.

Now we need to become equally sophisticated about understanding the commerce behind those transactions.

The businesses.

The products.

The evidence.

The regulations.

The changes.

And the actions required when something no longer meets the rules.

Because the next era of acquiring won't be defined simply by which institutions are willing to accept more risk.

It may be defined by which institutions have the intelligence to understand risk more precisely.

DON'T CONFUSE WHAT YOU WON'T SUPPORT WITH WHAT YOU CAN'T YET UNDERSTAND.

The difference could be your next competitive advantage.

Sources and Further Reading

FDA — FDA Intends to Evaluate Changes to the PMTA Regulatory Framework, September 28, 2026
FDA — Premarket Tobacco Product Applications
Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General — ENDS Directory
Bloomberg Law — Iowa Vapor Products Directory Publication and Enforcement Delayed, October 20, 2026
Qredible — Merchant and Product Intelligence
This article also appears on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/your-banks-risk-appetite-might-actually-technology-fitzgerald-cpp-csg4e/

 

About Qredible

Qredible is redefining merchant underwriting through Merchant Risk Intelligence (MRI)—a product-first approach that continuously analyzes what businesses sell, how they market those products, and the evidence required to support compliant payment acceptance. By moving beyond static industry classifications, Qredible helps banks, payment processors, ISOs, and sponsor banks make faster, more informed, and more defensible underwriting decisions while reducing manual effort and strengthening ongoing portfolio oversight. Learn more about Qredible's product-first automated compliance management platform for regulated industries →



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